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MORAL ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF
CARL ROGERS AND VICTOR FRANKL

BY

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The undersigned certify that they have read,
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ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to determine the moral assumptions underlying the psychological theories of Carl Rogers and Victor Frankl. The two concepts examined are: the nature of man and the nature of the good life. By moral assumptions the investigator means a psychologist's thinking pertaining to the rightness or wrongness of a given human behavior. The nature of man refers to the essence or core or self of a person as it relates to and functions within the personal and non-personal environment. The good life is defined as that life which permits and moves toward the realization of personal and social values.

In the introduction a brief review is given of current literature which emphasizes the importance of not only recognizing but also acknowledging one's moral assumptions in all psychological research. The reasons for undertaking the present investigation are also stated.

This study is limited to the existential approach in psychology as represented by Carl Rogers in America and Victor Frankl in Europe. A brief analysis of existential theory in psychology is given in chapter two.

In chapters three and four an attempt is made to determine the moral assumptions of Carl Rogers and Victor Frankl as they relate to the nature of man and the nature of the good life. The influences of the psychological and social environments, as well as

the intellectual climate of each author are noted. Both Rogers and Frankl emphasize the importance of man's "existential" nature. Contrary to Behaviorists who focus on the nature of an organism's response, Rogers and Frankl focus on the nature of an organism's experience. The concept of "meaning" is central to their existential psychology. Man is viewed as a self-determining, self-actualizing organism who is free and responsible to himself and to society. The good life for Rogers is that which is characteristic of the "fully functioning person". For Frankl the good life consists in the actualization of creative, experiential, and attitudinal values.

The present investigation concludes with a brief comparison between the theories of Rogers and Frankl, and an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of each as interpreted by the present investigator.

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INTRODUCTION

Every psychological theory rests in part on the conscious or subconscious philosophical presuppositions of its creator. One of the most erroneous popular concept about psychology is portrayed in the saying: "Psychology tells us...." The fallacy implicit in such a statement is that psychology is a commonly agreed-upon voice, one which can speak with the same authority as that of astronomy which predicts the exact course of a planet. The task of the psychologist is far more difficult than that of the astronomer. Whereas inanimate nature pursues a relatively fixed course, human nature has as yet not been tamed in spite of the herculean efforts of Skinner and his followers. The predicament is enhanced by the fact that this unpredictable element in the human personality operates not only in the subject selected for observation but also in the observer. Recent research has supplied important data on the relationship between values and perception. Bruner and Goodman (1947) in an experiment with children from different social backgrounds found that values tended to distort perception. Similarly Bruner, Postman, and McGinnies (1948) discovered that speed of learning was directly proportional to the cathexis with which a given word had been invested. These and other experiments suggest that values and motivational needs are important determinants in perception and observation.

"People," says Gunnar Myrdal (1944, p. 1027), "have ideas about how reality actually is, or was, and they have ideas about how it ought to be, or ought to have been. The former we call 'beliefs'. The latter we call 'valuations'." These "beliefs" and "valuations" lie so near the heart of every scientist that they color his whole circulation. Without valuations we "have no interest, no sense of relevance or of significance and, consequently, no object for scientific investigation" (Myrdal, 1958, p. 54). A "disinterested social science", according to Myrdal, is "pure nonsense". It never existed and never will exist. The only way to make one's thinking rational and achieve some degree of objectivity is to keep one's valuations conscious and in the focus of attention throughout the investigation. "This is our only protection against bias in research, for bias implies being directed by unacknowledged valuations" (Myrdal, 1958, p. 52). Sol Ginsburg (Feifel, 1958) agrees that there is no such thing as "pure science". All science is positively or negatively affected by the subjective value judgments of the scientist.

Robert Lynd (1940) also bemoans the fact that social scientists frequently plunge into all kinds of research before they have taken a serious look at their own philosophical pre-suppositions which frequently provide the impetus and give direction to their research. Because of their passion to be "scientific" they have failed to realize that nearly every move in a

scientific investigation is coupled with value judgments: values determine one's choice of the field of inquiry; they guide the researcher as he establishes the level of significance and separates the significant data from the insignificant. Values provide the necessary motivation during the research and influence the thinking of the investigator as he interprets the evidence of his investigation.

Similarly Carl Rogers (1961, p. 216) draws attention to the fact that science exists only in people.

Each scientific project has its creative inception, its process, and its tentative conclusion, in a person or persons. Knowledge--even scientific knowledge--is that which is subjectively acceptable. Scientific knowledge can be communicated only to those who are subjectively ready to receive its communication. The utilization of science also occurs only through people who are in pursuit of values which have meaning for them.

Thus, Rogers concludes, a scientist may at times refuse to believe his own "objective" findings and place more trust in his total organismic reaction than in the methods of science. The dictum of Carl Becker the historian, "the facts of history do not exist for any historian until he creates them" (Carr, 1961, p. 21), applies equally well to science.

Another writer who cautions against the influences of subconscious philosophical presuppositions is Rollo May (1961, p. 29): "Every method is based on certain presuppositions--assumptions about the nature of man, the nature of his experience, and so forth." Since one's philosophical "substratum" partially

determines what an investigator sees in a problem, experiment, or therapeutic interview, it is necessary that a psychologist analyze and clarify continually his own assumptions. There is no escape from this human "finiteness". Says May (1961, p. 30):

The naturalist perceives in man what fits his naturalistic spectacles; the positivist sees the aspects of experience that fit the logical forms of his presuppositions; and it is well known that different therapists of different schools will see in the same dream of a single patient the dynamics that fit the theory of their particular school.

Gutheil (Tweedie, 1961, p. 39) speaks in a similar vein:

The patients of Adlerians have, apparently, only problems of power, and their conflicts appear to be exclusively conditioned by their ambition, their striving for superiority and the like. The patients of the disciples of Jung flood their physicians with archetypes and all kinds of analogic symbolisms. The Freudians hear the castration complex, the birth trauma, and similar things stated by their patients.

Behavioristic psychologists, still under the sway of Darwinian thought, have tended to dismiss moral values as irrelevant to both the scientific and human enterprise, or, with Freud, to regard them as little more than neurotic symptoms. The reason for their minimal contribution to an understanding of human behavior in spite of a maximum output of experimental labor has been suggested by the British psychiatrist Ernest White (1955, p. 11) who said: "One often finds that questions do not admit of a clear answer because the assumptions on which they rest are false." Bertrand Russell aptly said: "Physics is mathemat-

ical not because we know so much about the physical world but because we know so little: it is only its mathematical properties that we can discover" (May, 1961, p. 30). Gotshalk (1963, p. 111) strongly recommends that current scientific methodology be made more flexible so as to become suitable for the investigation of subjectmatter lying outside of the natural sciences. Says he,

Despite the opinion of many severe critics of science.... and despite the creed of many current scientists, who would limit science to mechanistic natural science, our view is that natural science is not science, but only one form of it, and that science properly is any systematic theoretic inquiry into an empirically accessible field governed by certain aims: "objectivity," accuracy, comprehensiveness among them. Our proposal is to extend this type of inquiry to the totic factor in its distinctive nature, namely, as a principle of evaluation and the ruling action principle of domains and fields of value. The conception of science as limited to natural science has been a dogma of great strength in modern times, and has been particularly constricting in recent times in the human and social fields. "As things stand today," Perry writes, "the human and social sciences are more in need of emancipating themselves from the bigotry of natural science than of adopting its method."

Rollo May (1961, p. 30) concurs with Myrdal that the only way of keeping one's presuppositions from having an undue biasing effect on the results of an investigation is to "know consciously what they are and so not to absolutize or dogmatize them." May continues:

One can gather empirical data, let us say on religion and art, from now till doomsday, and one will never get any closer to understanding these activities if, to start with, his presuppositions

shut out what the religious person is dedicated to and what the artist is trying to do. Deterministic presuppositions make it possible to understand everything about art except the creative act and the art itself; mechanistic naturalistic presuppositions may undercover many facts about religion, but, as in Freud's terms, religion will always turn out to be more or less a neurosis, and what the genuinely religious person is concerned with will never get into the picture at all.

To experience and understand the real meaning of religion and the creative life in general we must go "beyond psychology".

Carl Jung once gave his students this pertinent advice:

If one wishes to understand the human soul, he need not bother with experimental psychology of the laboratory, which can tell him practically nothing. He would be better advised to take off his academic robes, and wander with open heart through the world.... He will come back with wisdom which no five-foot shelf of textbooks could give him, and he will be capable of being a doctor to the human soul (Watson, 1958, p. 576).

It is to the credit of existential psychology that it has drawn attention to the philosophical foundations of theories of human behavior. Maslow (May, 1961, p. 35) believes that the existential emphasis in recent psychological thinking may well supply behavioristic psychology with the underlying philosophy which it now lacks. It is probably not a coincidence that behaviorism has flourished in both the naturalistic climate of Russia and in the pragmatic climate of America. A. H. Halsey (1961, p. 503), reflecting on the position of the social sciences in Britain and in America, notices a major distinction with reference to what he terms the "academic gods" of each. In the

United States natural science holds almost monotheistic sway over the social scientist whereas in Britain there is a polytheistic worship of diverse deities such as history, Karl Marx, positivism and the institution of the Royal Commission, and especially the humanistic aspect of each." R. K. Merton (Halsey, 1961, p. 504) facetiously attached the following motto to the work of the typical American investigator: "We don't know that what we say is particularly significant, but it is at least true." Robert Lynd (1940, p. 129), referring to the same problem, remarked:

One of the perplexing commonplaces of the university lecture hall is the fact that whole courses and batteries of courses leading to advanced degrees are "passed" and dissertations are written without the question ever being raised as to what is to be done with all this knowledge--other than to give more lectures and to supervise the writing of more dissertations.

Psychology, in so far as it is concerned with human behavior, is inseparably linked to education. Education, however, is continually confronted with value judgments. The task of the school is not merely to transmit culture but also to improve culture. In the words of Ottaway (1954, p. 161), "it is not enough to educate for society as it is, we must also ask what its future ought to be, and direct our energies toward the realization of our ideal." Ottaway continues: "Through education we are making a deliberate attempt to guide the development of children, and anyone who sets out to guide others must be following some

theory, conscious or unconscious, of the direction in which they should go. There is really no such thing as allowing the child freedom to develop in his own way." The moral assumptions underlying the theory of each educative process provide the disciplines and standards that enable the educator to judge what is good for a society. "If our standards are so flexible that we cannot judge," warns Ottaway, "then our society is in danger of breakdown because a stable core of values is not being maintained." It is not the presence of moral assumptions in the investigator that is regrettable--their presence is both inevitable and desirable--but the conscious or subconscious denial of their presence. It is highly imperative therefore, for a proper understanding and evaluation of current psychological theory and practice, to investigate the philosophical foundations which lie at the root of the different methods and approaches used in studying human behavior.

Statement of the Problem

It is the purpose of this investigation to determine the moral assumptions underlying the psychological theories of Carl Rogers and Victor Frankl. The two concepts which shall be examined are: (a) the nature of man, and (b) the nature of the good life. The problem to be investigated is important to psychology for two reasons: First, one's presuppositions concerning the nature of man will determine the methodology used in (a) the

study of human behavior and (b) in the treatment of abnormal behavior. Second, one's ideas of the good life will determine the purpose of education and the goal of psychotherapy.

Definition of Terms

1. Moral Assumptions. Morality relates to that which is regarded as right and just by members of a given society. As such it is not something firmly settled and rigid. "What makes an issue moral," writes Watson (1958, p. 574), "is that there are consequences which affect the life and welfare of human beings." Similarly Garry (1960, pp. 3-4) says: "When one speaks of morality one is concerned with the rightness or wrongness of some behavior or response in accordance with some social standards of conduct usually associated with a particular group and usually believed to derive their sanction from absolute authority rather than the will of individuals." Inasmuch as psychology is concerned with human behavior it is also concerned with morality. "An amoral therapy is a contradiction in terms," says Watson (1958, p. 575). The same author contends that the meaning and contribution of psychology will be enlarged as psychologists "add to their technical competence a broader and deeper realization of life's persistent ethical problems." Watson (1958, p. 576) concludes with this timely admonition: "We need more awareness of the grand dimensions of the human spirit, more appreciation of the insights achieved by great minds before

Freud, and, perhaps also, more humility because of our own vast ignorance."

2. The Nature of Man. The concept "nature of man" is difficult to define apart from a number of questions which bring into focus different images from its broad spectrum of meaning. In the context of the present investigation it shall refer to the sum total of man's innate psycho-physical properties and powers, and their manifestation in behavior. An attempt will be made to determine Rogers' and Frankl's philosophical presuppositions as they relate to such questions as: (a) Is the essence or core or self of man physiological, psychological, or spiritual in nature? (b) What is man's place in the cosmos? Does he have duties and responsibilities, or are all moral oughts meaningless concepts? (c) Is man free or is his behavior physiologically and psychically determined? (d) Is human behavior wholly the result of innate and environmental forces and conditions, or are other forces, such as extrasensory perception, operative? (e) Does man live in a gestaltian field which tends toward closure? In other words, are there innate needs or drives in man's psychological constitution which move in the direction of self-actualization, self-fulfilment, and moral constancy? If so, is a person's failure to achieve self-actualization, self-fulfilment, and moral constancy the result of moral defection or of cognitive or psychic malfunctioning?

3. The Nature of the Good Life. The greater part of human behavior is goal-directed. The multitude of impulses, desires, and drives of an individual are differentiated into a pattern of behavior by his physical structure, his training, his temperament, and similar factors. This differentiated pattern of behavior at each stage of growth circumscribes a person's range of values or goals. The good life is that which permits and moves toward the realization of these values. As such it has two dimensions: the psychological and the social. The psychological dimension involves values which relate to the well-being of the individual; the social dimension involves values which relate to the well-being of society. In a heterogeneous society an individual's concept of the good life may include components which are incompatible with the standards and expectations of society. A discussion of the good life inevitably leads to a number of questions. For example: Can effective therapy take place if the client's concept of the good life is incongruent with that of the therapist? Or, can a client after counseling maintain the new cognitions if the therapist's idea of the good life, which the client has wholly or in part adopted, is incompatible with that of the society in which the client lives? Where is the good life to be sought, in the spiritual, in the social, and/or in the material realm? Is it plausible to assume that the good life which is centred in religious or materialistic values is more diversified than that which is sought in social

values? Must the good life always involve a religious experience and, if so, is such a goal of an ultimate or of a relative nature? In other words, is the idea of the good life innate, or is it a psychological product of the environment? Lastly, are the attributes of the good life always positive in nature, or may they at times include elements which are negatively charged, as in substitutionary suffering?

Organization and Approach

The problem to be investigated is both psychological and philosophical in nature and, consequently, does not lend itself to statistical treatment. In the introduction the present writer hoped to underscore two facts: First, every theorist is guided by moral presuppositions and, second, moral presuppositions should be acknowledged and as much as possible objectified. In chapter two a very brief analysis will be given of existential psychology. In chapters three and four the writer will discuss the moral assumptions, as delimited in the definition above, of the psychological theories of Carl Rogers and Victor Frankl. Both theorists are strong advocates of the existential position in psychology, Carl Rogers representing the American and Victor Frankl the European scene respectively. The method of analysis shall be confined to explicit and implicit statements relating to moral assumptions found in the writings of Carl Rogers and Victor Frankl. The present investigation will conclude with a

summary statement of the findings, a brief comparison of Rogers' and Frankl's views, and suggestions for further research in the field under consideration.

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CHAPTER II

EXISTENTIAL PSYCHOLOGY

Soren Kierkegaard is usually regarded to be the father of existentialism-- a philosophical movement which swept Europe and has made considerable inroads in many other parts of the world. Rising up in protest against what he considered the two great false doctrines of the academic world, "truth is objectivity" and "the real is the rational," Kierkegaard asserted that "truth is inwardness, subjectivity" and "the real is the individual." The works of this nineteenth century Danish philosopher-theologian have been revived in the twentieth century. His ideas have made a noticeable impact on theology, philosophy, and psychology. The question of the meaning of man's existence, first raised by Kierkegaard, was reiterated by subsequent writers, such as Bergson, Heidegger, Jaspers, and Satre. Existential psychology, as promulgated by Binswanger, Rogers, Frankl, and others, is a direct outgrowth of existential philosophy.

Existential psychology, being preoccupied with the meaning of man's existence, has been responsible for the increasing emphasis given to philosophical issues in psychotherapy. Thus Paul Tillich (Ruitenbeek, 1962), in an article entitled "Existentialism and Psychotherapy", draws attention to the fact that many concepts which have proved more or less useful in directing research as well as practical work in psychotherapy are devoid

of a philosophical foundation and, consequently, "without critical and uniting principles. No therapeutic theory can be developed without an implicit or explicit image of man." Similarly Medard Boss (Ruitenbeek, 1962), a European psychoanalyst, believes that all problems, answers, and resulting actions are invariably guided by the prescientific notions about the nature and purpose of man which each investigator carries within himself:

No matter whether he is explicitly aware of his "philosophical" assumptions or whether he rejects all "philosophy" and attempts to be a "pure empiricist," the fact remains that such more or less hidden philosophical presuppositions, which are at the root of all science, are of fundamental importance.

Tweedie (1961) has summarized man's thinking about man in four central theories all of which, in the opinion of the author, are of ancient origin. Even though some of them sound rather recent in the history of thought, they are merely old ideas garbed in "contemporary verbiage more befitting the scientific era." The first philosophy of man is what may be called the physicalistic view. Man is regarded as a chance concatenation of physical particles in a universe which contains only atoms and the void. He is a machine, similar but more complex than the electronic computer. Says Tweedie (1961, p. 16):

Every aim and aspiration, every joy and every sorrow, is but an instance of action and reaction, attraction and repulsion, exemplary data of physical laws.... Every thought and every desire of man is merely the occasion of material complexes, logically no more nor less significant than the friction of two grains of sand in the Sahara Desert.

This mechanistic view of man has been popularized by Pavlov, Watson, and the behaviorists who have followed in their train.

Another widely held view of man, according to Tweedie, is the "phylogenetic". The human being is regarded as a complex biological organism which cannot be explained by the rules and principles of physical theory. The main function and goal of this biological specimen is survival and reproduction. Though the gulf between the organic and the inorganic has been narrowed through biochemical research, proponents of this view hold that it has as yet not been bridged. Gestalt psychologists and some neo-behaviorists have given whole or partial support to this view of the nature of man.

From Socrates and his pupil Plato comes the third view of man. To them the biological structure was merely the "prison house" of the true essence of man--the rational and immortal soul. Man, according to this view, is truly human when he is thinking. His imperfections and problems vanish when ignorance vanishes. The true nature is attained if reason reigns supreme. The modern avalanche of enthusiasm for natural science has all but blotted out the remaining traces of this view. In recent years it has been somewhat revived under the enthusiastic leadership of Mortimer Adler and his Great Ideas.

A final view of man regards human nature as essentially religious. The idea that man was created in the image of God is the contribution of the Hebrew-Christian "Weltanschauung".

Existential psychology does not advocate any one of these theories in particular, it does however repudiate the physicalistic or mechanistic view of man. Holding that the nature of man cannot be explained in terms of the physiological only, existential psychologists see a necessary relationship between psychology and philosophy. All creative functions of the human mind have a philosophy in their background which must be brought into the open and subjected to criticism and transformation. At the same time all creative functions of man's spirit must contribute to a philosophy. Thus psychologists cannot identify themselves with a particular philosophy, while at the same time they cannot be without a philosophy. Freud's philosophy, for example, was a blend of naturalism and idealism. From the former he derived his determinism and from the latter he inherited his moralism. The absence of existentialism in his philosophy forbade him to explain in acceptable terms man's aspiration toward the sublime as exemplified in works of art, music, religion, etc.. Existential psychology does not presume to introduce philosophy into psychiatry and psychotherapy. Rather, it seeks to lay bare the philosophic foundations of these disciplines.

The existential emphasis in psychology is not a modification of old techniques. It is rather a new approach to the age old questions of human behavior. It is a revolt against the operationalism and statistical exactitude of American psychology. An understanding of existential philosophy is essential for an

effective application of the existential method in psychotherapy.

According to Van Dusen (Ruitenbeek, 1962, p. 26) there are two fundamental approaches to the study of human behavior:

One, the hallmark of Western science, is to attempt to study objects and their functions directly while trying to eliminate man's subjectivity as far as possible. The other makes man's experience the centre of the picture. The former, "objective" approach, involves a deception: it implies that man, for all practical purposes, can be eliminated from the picture. Physics is the most objective, pointer reading of all sciences. Yet modern physics has given up the possibility of eliminating the pointer reader from the pointer readings. It is all the more remarkable that psychology and psychiatry, the most subjective of sciences, are still trying to throw out the observer.

In addition to making man's experience the centre of attention, existential psychology concentrates on the temporal Now. The past is important only in so far as it affects a person's present behavior. Similarly the future is critical only in so far as it has a representation in a person's present cognitions. Scanning the horizon of psychological interest, Van Dusen (Ruitenbeek, 1962, p. 34) notices a basic difference between the European and the American scene:

The European development lies in the direction of penetrating deeper into experience and of keeping as close as possible to artistic modes of expression. The American trend is toward capturing the mind in its exact projection (data collection) and toward manipulating this objectification in as exact a mode as possible. This is shown in the American interest in statistics and in operationalism. To Americans, the European mode of

approach appears to be outside of science. To Europeans, Americans, in their demand for exactitude and certainty, seem to squeeze the life out of things.

According to Rollo May (Ruitenbeek, 1962, p. 179) there has not yet been time for the existential approach in psychology and psychiatry to find its particular form in America, nor has there been time for its contributions to become significant. As yet there seems to be a "confusion of tongues". Rollo May also objects to labeling this approach a "school". To him existentialism is an attitude, an approach to human beings. It has to do with the presuppositions underlying a psychotherapeutic technique.

CHAPTER III

MORAL ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF CARL ROGERS

A Brief Biographical Note

The cornerstone of one's morality is usually laid in the home. Those who are acquainted with both Rogers' early upbringing and his later contributions in the field of psychology cannot fail but see a positive correlation between the two. Rogers was reared in a home which in his own words was "marked by close family ties, a very strict and uncompromising religious and ethical atmosphere, and what amounted to a worship of the virtue of hard work" (1961, p. 5). Though very affectionate, his parents assumed a controlling and protective role toward the children. Drinking, dancing, card-playing, and movies were not tolerated. Rogers spent his early years on a farm where he not only practiced hard work but also learned to appreciate the contributions and the methodology of agricultural science.

Upon graduation from high school Rogers enrolled in college at Wisconsin with the intention of pursuing studies in the field of agriculture. As a result of some "emotionally charged student religious conferences" he changed his goal from agriculture to that of the Christian ministry. While in his junior year, he was selected as one of a dozen students from America to attend a World Student Christian Federation Conference in China. Rogers regards this experience as the turning point in his life, for

it was this association with other-minded believers that helped him to emancipate himself from the religious thinking of his parents and in a sense become an independent person.

In 1924 Rogers enrolled in Union Theological Seminary, New York, which was probably the most liberal theological school of that day. The free atmosphere of this centre of learning led him to give up altogether his plans for the ministry and instead prepare for work in the related fields of psychology and psychiatry. After further training in child guidance at Teachers' College, Columbia University, he took up a position as psychologist in the Child Study Department of the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children in Rochester, New York. Although the next twelve years in Rochester were years of relative professional isolation, they were nevertheless exceedingly valuable years. Rogers' clinical experience during this period shaped his conviction that it is the client who "knows what hurts, what directions to go, what problems are crucial, what experiences have been deeply buried" (1961, pp. 11-12).

In 1940 Rogers accepted a position at Ohio State University which he kept for five years. His teaching experience with graduate students helped him to crystallize a distinctive view of his own which was subsequently set forth in Counseling and Psychotherapy. Following this he taught for twelve years at the University of Chicago. Presently he is professor in the Department of Psychology and Psychiatry at the University of

Wisconsin.

Rogers' View of the Nature of Man

One does not need to read very far in Rogers to meet with a much used concept: the concept of experience. Although not infallible, experience is nevertheless the primary means whereby a person gains insight into his true self. It is the highest authority for the validity of one's being. It also has a kind of built-in self-corrective device whereby one experience corrects another one. Because of this self-corrective device it is possible to "trust" one's experience. Says Rogers (1961, p. 22), "One of the basic things which I was a long time in realizing, and which I am still learning, is that when an activity feels as though it is valuable or worth doing, it is worth doing."

Rogers makes no attempt to cast his concept of experience into a scientific language. For him the term refers to the total reaction of an organism to a given situation. Cognition is a part of this total reaction, but when functioning alone it is subject to it. Rogers maintains that his total organismic sensing of a situation is more trustworthy than his intellect. At times this inner sensing may be non-intellectual or even appear anti-intellectual. Rogers avoids, however, any identification of this sensing with what is called "conscience".

One reason why Rogers regards experience as authoritative

and trustworthy is because it is lawful and orderly. Discovering the laws of order which govern human experience produces "meaning" for the discoverer and enables him to help clients to that same discovery. Whether law and order in one's experience are an innate endowment of man or whether they are learned and internalized at an early age Rogers does not say.

Rogers believes that there is a basic uniformity in human nature, that is, what is most personal is also most general. In the words of Rogers (1961, p. 26), "I have almost invariably found that the very feeling which has seemed to me most private, most personal, and hence most incomprehensible by others, has turned out to be an expression for which there is a resonance in many other people."

The principle of "self-actualization" is central to Rogers' psychology. Every person has within himself the capacity and the tendency, latent if not evident, to move forward to maturity. If a suitable psychological climate is created--in Rogers' non-directive therapy this climate consists of a client's relationship to the therapist--this tendency toward self-actualization is released, thus becoming actual rather than potential. This human drive toward self-actualization is in essence a tendency to reorganize one's personality and relationship to life in ways which are "more mature". "It is the urge," says Rogers (1961, p. 35), "which is evident in all organic human life--to expand, extend, become autonomous, develop, mature--the tendency to ex-

press and activate all the capacities of the organism, to the extent that such activation enhances the organism or the self." The relationship which releases this tendency toward self-actualization is defined by Rogers (1961, p. 40) as one "in which one of the participants intends that there should come about, in one or both parties, more appreciation of, more expression of, more functional use of the latent inner resources of the individual." It should be added here, however, that psychotherapy does not supply the motivation toward self-actualization-- this motivation is inherent in every individual-- it merely releases and facilitates the tendency toward self-actualization.

Not only is human experience governed by law and order, its direction is always "positive, constructive, moving toward self-actualization, growing toward maturity, growing toward socialization" (Rogers, 1961, p. 26). According to Rogers this recognition that the innermost core of man's nature is positive and basically socialized, forward-moving, rational, and realistic was an outgrowth of his clinical experience. To him it was a revolutionary concept, quite contrary to the psychoanalytic thinking of his day.

The present investigator will take the liberty to digress a little at this point. It is somewhat strange that Rogers' clinical experience led him to conclusions which are in direct opposition to those adopted by Sigmund Freud because of his clinical experience. In Freudian theory the id, or man's basic un-

conscious nature, is irrational, unsocialized, and destructive to others and self. The classic Protestant tradition in which Rogers was reared takes a similarly dim view of man's inherent goodness. From where then did Rogers get this optimism about man? It will be remembered that while in college Rogers came to reject the religious beliefs of his parents in favor of a liberal gospel which was very popular in Rogers' student days. Trust in human reason and the inherent goodness of man lay at the very heart of the social gospel advocated by Union Theological Seminary which Rogers attended for a few years. Besides this, John Dewey's philosophy of progressivism had won great respect in America. It appears to the present investigator that what Rogers calls a revolutionary new concept was little more than the emergence of latent theological and philosophical presuppositions acquired during his stay at Union Theological Seminary.

An individual's experiencing of himself--a much used concept in Rogers-- has a definite psychological basis, for therapy, according to Rogers (1961, p. 103), "seems to mean a getting back to basic sensory and visceral experience." Added to this sensory and visceral experiencing, which is characteristic of the whole animal kingdom, is the gift of a "free and undistorted awareness of which only the human animal seems fully capable." When this unique capacity of awareness is functioning freely and fully, "we find that we have, not an animal whom we must fear,

nor a beast who must be controlled, but an organism able to achieve, through the remarkable integrative capacity of its central nervous system, a balanced, realistic, self-enhancing, other-enhancing behavior as a resultant of all these elements of awareness (Rogers, 1961, p. 105). Such behavior will not always be conventional, or conforming, but it will always be individualized and socialized. Rogers does not account for the possible origin of this individualized and socialized behavior. The reader gets the impression that these positive tendencies are innate in each individual.

Rogers as an existential psychologist places great emphasis on the subjective experience of the individual. As an objective investigator of human behavior, however, he is also committed to a complete determinism. In spite of honest attempts, Rogers does not seem to succeed altogether in resolving this paradox in his own thinking. The fully functioning person is psychologically free to choose. His choice, however, is determined by all the factors in the existential situation. Hence Rogers concludes: "The fully functioning person ..., not only experiences, but utilizes, the most absolute freedom when he spontaneously, freely, and voluntarily chooses and wills that which is also absolutely determined" (1961, p. 193). The question which causes which is not answered. Does a person's psychological freedom lead him to choose an existential situation which will determine a type of behavior congruent with the

fully functioning person, or does the existential situation, created by the therapist, lead to psychological freedom, which in turn helps the person in adjusting to a type of behavior demanded by the environment? In the first instance the person has free will, in the second he has none. By abandoning the concept of freedom from his psychology, Rogers would destroy a vital part of his theoretical structure. On the other hand, if he abandons the idea of determinism he would lose the confidence of his scientifically-minded pupils. Rogers himself seems to be very much aware of the gap that exists within him when he as a psychotherapist becomes subjectively involved in the counselor-client relationship, and as a scientific investigator seeks to remain totally objective. His attempts at reconciling the two functions have resulted in a modified view of science. Although admitting the concept of determinism into his thinking, Rogers is much more inclined toward the idea of personal freedom-- a tendency which he no doubt acquired from his theological training and existential philosophy. Thus in psychotherapy Rogers sees himself in relationship with a person "who is spontaneous, who is responsibly free, that is, aware of his freedom to choose who he will be, and aware also of the consequences of his choice" (1961, p. 391). In research, to the contrary, he sees himself as an objective scientist whose work can be validated by statistical data.

In spite of his religious upbringing and his theological

training Rogers consciously avoids interpreting human nature as religious. Contrary to Frankl who freely uses such terms as soul, spirit, or spiritual, Rogers restricts himself to concepts which do not carry religious overtones. He does, however, interpret human nature from a "centralist" position. A peripheral explanation of the complexity of human behavior would be untenable to him.

Since man in Rogers' theory is a self-actualizing organism, there is no room for such concepts as guilt or sin proposed by Mowrer (1961). Guilt feelings or sin-consciousness are the result of cognitive distortions or inhibition of the self-actualization process. In other words, they have no place in the thinking and experience of the fully functioning person.

In accordance with his existential interpretation of human nature, Rogers gives individuality priority over sociality. The person who experiences himself as an individual will also fulfil his duties as a member of society. Man's primary function is and remains the actualization of self rather than society. Man's duties and responsibilities, consequently, are essentially those relating to his own individuality. The well-being of self takes precedence over the well-being of society. In fact, the fully functioning person is also a socialized person. The aim of all psychotherapy, therefore, must be to help people become fully functioning individuals. A society composed of fully functioning individuals will be a fully functioning society.

Rogers' View of the Nature of the Good Life

Rogers by no means regards it an insult if he is being accused of thinking philosophical thoughts. To the contrary, he freely admits that he searches for meaning in the things that he observes. Questions like "What is my goal in life?", or "What is my purpose?" are being asked by every individual at one time or another, and therapy is usually incomplete until the client has found a satisfactory answer to these questions. For some the purpose of life is to "glorify God and enjoy him forever". For others it consists of "preparation for the life to come". For still others it consists of an earthly goal, such as the satisfaction of physiological, psychological and social needs.

In Rogers' thinking the aim of life is best expressed in the words of Kierkegaard: "To be that self which one truly is." Even as there is a basic core in man's nature which is uniform from person to person, so there is a common goal toward which all men strive. This goal, Rogers maintains, can be ascertained through observation in therapeutic relationships. In other words, Rogers claims that his own view of the good life has emerged from his experience with clients.

My views regarding the meaning of the good life are largely based upon my experience in working with people in the very close and intimate relationship which is called psychotherapy. These views thus have an empirical or experiential foundation, as contrasted perhaps with a scholarly or philosophical foundation. I have learned

what the good life seems to be by observing and participating in the struggles of disturbed and troubled people to achieve that life (Rogers, 1961, p. 184).

Since Rogers visualizes the nature of man as an ongoing process rather than a fixed state, the good life is also characterized by movement. It is not a "state of virtue, or contentment, or nirvana, or happiness". It is further, "not a condition in which the individual is adjusted, or fulfilled, or actualized." Or, to use more appropriate terms, it is "not a state of drive-reduction, or tension-reduction, or homeostasis". Rather, it is a process, or movement away from that which one is not to that which one truly is.

Becoming that self which one truly is means, first of all, moving away from facades or the self which one is not. Thus the good life can only be lived by the person who dares to "be himself" rather than hide behind an assumed self. In Freudian terms, a person who lives the good life will be free from the encumbrance of all defense mechanisms.

In the second place, achieving the good life means moving away from the compelling image of what one "ought to be". It appears to the present investigator that Rogers here uses a concept which can easily be accommodated in Freud's idea of the super ego and a certain amount of compulsion neurosis. Although Rogers avoids the term "conscience", he seems to have in mind a moving away from what Erich Fromm has called "authoritarian con-

science" to "humanistic conscience". The former is the voice of an external authority which has been internalized by the person; the latter is the voice of the person himself. The former is imperative, the latter is suggestive in its demands. Rogers' concept of the good life thus excludes the idea of "duty" as commonly understood. Unfortunately Rogers does not state explicitly what initiates this movement away from the unreal to the real, other than that it is some innate tendency within the individual. It is somewhat difficult to account for the presence of such noble motivation in Rogers' "conscience-free" person.

A third characteristic of the good life, one which is closely related to the second, is a movement away from meeting expectations. According to Riesman (1950) present-day society is "other-directed". This other-directed society breeds a human specimen which Whyte (1956) has termed the "organization man". All kinds of pressures--economic, social, and political--are exerted upon the members of this society in order to subordinate their individuality to the group norm. If an individual moves away from group expectation he recovers his individuality. Whether or not this recovery of one's individuality results in a loss of one's "social conscience" Rogers fails to make clear. Since man in Rogers' view is at heart a socialized being, moving away from group expectation presumably means abandoning forms of behavior which are either irrelevant or detrimental to the stability

and well-being of society. Instead of fulfilling the aspirations of others, the individual will fulfil his own aspirations.

The good life is a process which involves not only movement away from a false image of self, but also movement toward a true image of self. This movement toward a true image of self means, first of all, becoming autonomous. Instead of being directed in his behavior by group expectation, the individual now does what he "wants" to do. Or, to put it in more appropriate language, the individual's behavior is determined less by external stimuli and more by internal cognitive self-produced stimuli. Rogers here adopts Allport's idea of "functional autonomy". Functional autonomy, however, is not gained easily. Says Rogers (1961, p. 171): "Freedom to be oneself is a frighteningly responsible freedom, and an individual moves toward it cautiously, fearfully, and with almost no confidence at first."

The good life is also characterized by movement toward being a process. In therapy Rogers claims to have found that clients whose improvement was most notable were those whose conduct and attitudes were in a state of fluidity and change. Such patients, says Rogers (1961, p. 171), were no longer disturbed to "find that they are not the same from day to day, that they do not always hold the same feelings toward a given experience or person, that they are not always consistent". Instead, they were in a flux and seemed more content to continue in this "flowing current". For the person who is fully open to his own experiences and comp-

letely without defensiveness, each moment is "new". The complex configuration of external and internal stimulation existing at one particular moment has never existed before in exactly the same fashion. Consequently, neither the person experiencing these stimuli nor the person who observes can predict in advance the nature of the stimulus configuration or the behavior that will follow. According to Rogers it is more correct to say that self emerges from experience than that experience emerges from the structure of self. "Such living in the moment," says Rogers (1961, p. 189), "means an absence of rigidity, of tight organization, of the imposition of structure on experience. It means instead a maximum of adaptability, a discovery of structure in experience, a flowing, changing organization of self and personality. Rogers' idea of the good life bears a striking resemblance to an earlier description formulated by Kierkegaard (1941, p. 79):

An existing individual is constantly in process of becoming,... and translates all his thinking into terms of process. It is with (him)... as it is with a writer and his style; for he only has a style who never has anything finished, but "moves the waters of the language" every time he begins, so that the most common expression comes into being for him with the freshness of a new birth.

This process is by no means a simple one, and the individual must be aware of the complexity of the process in order to function autonomously. "I find that this desire to be all of oneself in each moment--all the richness and complexity, with nothing hidden from oneself, and nothing feared in oneself-- this is a

common desire in those who have seemed to show much movement in therapy" (Rogers, 1961, p. 172).

To "be that self which one truly is" involves furthermore a movement toward living in an open, friendly, and close relationship to one's own experience. As the individual discovers some new facets about himself he usually rejects it at first. However, as he experiences this new facet hitherto denied in an "acceptant climate" he gradually comes to accept it as part of himself. He finds it less terrifying and much closer to his experience. Thus experience becomes a friend rather than a frightening enemy. Says Rogers (1961, p. 187): "A large part of the process of therapy is the continuing discovery by the client that he is experiencing feelings and attitudes which heretofore he has not been able to be aware of, which he has not been able to 'own' as being a part of himself." If a person is fully open to his experience then every stimulus, whether originating in the environment or within the person, is freely relayed through the nervous system without being distorted by defense mechanisms. In other words, the person does not gate out those stimuli which appear threatening to the self, but he responds to each in full awareness. He is "free to live his feelings subjectively, as they exist in him, and also free to be aware of these feelings" (Rogers, 1961, p. 188). Individuals open to their own experience have, in the words of Maslow (1954, p. 214), "a wonderful capacity to appreciate again and again, freshly and naively, the basic goods of life with awe,

pleasure, wonder, and even ecstasy, however stale these experiences may be for other people." Hence, the person who lives the good life is usually a creative person. Being sensitive and open to the world and trusting his own ability to form new relationships with his environment, he is the kind of person from whom creative works emerge.

As the individual moves toward acceptance of his own experiences he also moves toward acceptance of the experiences of others. He values and appreciates his own experience as well as the experience of others for what it is. Life's circumstances are accepted as a matter of course. In the words of Maslow (1954, p. 207),

One does not complain about water because it is wet, nor about rocks because they are hard.... As the child looks out upon the world with wide, uncritical and innocent eyes, simply noting and observing what is the case, without either arguing the matter or demanding that it be otherwise, so does the self-actualizing person look upon human nature both in himself and in others.

Rogers seems to suggest as part of the good life acceptance of the ancient philosophy of the Stoics who were noted for their apathetic attitude toward life and its problems. He sidesteps however, an important human personality trait. People generally do not complain that the water is wet. They do complain, however, when the water is cold and they are quick to do something about it. There is a vast difference, for example, between accepting a person for his likes or dislikes of brunettes

and accepting him for his mistaken idea that two plus two are five. Does the acceptant relationship in the latter case not involve the duty of instruction? And if so, does such a sense of duty not preclude criticism and perhaps even rejection of another person's ideas and experiences?

Acceptance of self and others is rooted in an increasing trust and tendency to value the process which is oneself. Instead of relying on a code of ethics imposed by a group of people or an institution, or the expectations of others, or even the learned behavior patterns of past situations, the individual relies on his total organismic reaction to a new situation. He does what "feels right" and in so doing finds that it is a competent and trustworthy guide to behavior which is truly satisfying. The rationale for this belief is stated by Rogers (1961, p. 190) as follows:

The person who is fully open to his experience would have access to all of the available data in the situation, on which to base his behavior; the social demands, his own complex and possibly conflicting needs, his memories of similar situations, his perception of the uniqueness of this situation, etc., etc.. The data would be very complex indeed. But he could permit his total organism, his consciousness participating, to consider each stimulus, need, and demand, its relative intensity and importance, and out of this complex weighing and balancing, discover that course of action which would come closest to satisfying all his needs in the situation.

The basis of mistrust of one's experiences, according to Rogers, is "the inclusion of information which does not belong to a given situation or the exclusion of information which does". Learned

responses of a past situation are applied to a present situation even though the situation is different, or feelings arising out of a certain situation are inhibited or repressed instead of brought to awareness. Such inhibited or repressed feelings then find expression in a distorted way.

The good life is a process which moves in the direction of congruity between what one does or feels and what one actually is. What one is, is the path of life which an individual values most highly because it gives him autonomy to move in any direction and explore every facet of his fluid self. The person who is psychologically free to do so is a "fully functioning person" and lives the good life.

Rogers has also attempted to clarify certain misapprehensions which some critics have voiced to him about his view of the good life. There are those, for example, who have maintained that being what one truly is would mean to be bad, evil, uncontrolled, destructive. Rogers rejects this Freudian concept outrightly. He does not say that an individual will not have such "negative" urges, but in a fully functioning person these feelings take their appropriate place in a "total harmony of his feelings". The person finds that he has other feelings with which these mingle and establish a balance. In Rogers' own words,

... when one is truly and deeply a unique member of the human species, this is not something which should excite horror. It means instead that one

lives fully and openly the complex process of being one of the most widely sensitive, responsive, and creative creatures on this planet. Fully to be one's own uniqueness as a human being is not, in my experience, a process which would be labeled bad. More appropriate words might be that it is a positive, or a constructive, or a realistic, or a trustworthy process (1961, p. 178).

On another occasion Rogers (1961, pp. 194-195) speaks in a similar vein:

I have little sympathy with the rather prevalent concept that man is basically irrational, and that his impulses, if not controlled, will lead to destruction of others and self. Man's behavior is exquisitely rational, moving with subtle and ordered complexity toward the goals his organism is endeavoring to achieve. The tragedy for most of us is that our defenses keep us from being aware of this rationality, so that consciously we are moving in one direction, while organismically we are moving in another. But in our person who is living the process of the good life, there would be a decreasing number of such barriers, and he would be increasingly a participant in the rationality of his organism. The only control of impulses which would exist, or which would prove necessary, is the natural and internal balancing of one need against another, and the discovery of behaviors which follow the vector most closely approximating the satisfaction of all needs.

As previously stated, it is difficult for the present investigator to understand Rogers' concept of the self. Is this self with all of its positive attributes something which is given to every human being at birth? Are the many negative attributes merely distortions of the good or imbalances in the total reservoir of feelings? Rogers seems to give very little credit to the extensive research carried on by learning theor-

ists who would seriously question some of the foregoing assumptions. The present investigator conjectures that Rogers' optimistic view of human nature is based on a sample of clients which is not truly representative. Americans in general are still deeply embedded in the Protestant Ethic of their forefathers. Hence, some of the noble aspirations which Rogers discovered in his clients may have an environmental origin. It is doubtful whether similar aspirations would be found among tribes whose philosophical and social climate is very different from the American.

Rogers believes that the good life can also find expression on the social and political level. The question how this core of goodness in man's nature is transferred to the group is not answered. Presumably the actualizing process of a group, community, or nation is merely the actualization of individual selves who stand in an open relationship to each other. Even Rogers will no doubt admit that it is quite meaningless to speak of a nation "becoming what it truly is".

Rogers' view of the nature of the good life may be summarized as follows: It is a process, not a state of being; it is a direction, not a destination; the direction of the good life is that which is selected by the total organism when there is psychological freedom to move in any direction. Rogers assumes of course that because of his native goodness the individual will move in the "right" direction, that is, he will choose a life in conformity with the ethical norms of society. The good life then,

as defined by Rogers (1961, p. 187), "is the process of movement in a direction which the human organism selects when it is inwardly free to move in any direction, and the general qualities of this selected direction appear to have a certain universality."

CHAPTER IV

MORAL ASSUMPTIONS IN THE PSYCHOLOGY OF VICTOR FRANKL

A Brief Biographical Note

Victor Frankl heads what he commonly refers to as the "Third Viennese School of Psychotherapy", the predecessors being the Freudian and Adlerian Schools. Unfortunately only a few of his many publications have been translated into English. At present Victor Frankl is professor of neurology and psychiatry at the Medical School of the University of Vienna and head of the Neurological Department of the Poliklinik Hospital of Vienna. He holds doctorates in philosophy and medicine and has the distinction of being president of the Austrian Medical Society of Psychotherapy. His lecture tours have taken him to many parts of the world, including the United States where he has been a visiting professor at Harvard University.

In his recent book, Man's Search for Meaning, Frankl relates his experiences which have led to the discovery of logotherapy, his own version of "Daseins Analyse" or existential analysis. At the outbreak of World War Two, Frankl was director of psychotherapy in a large mental hospital and a respected medical doctor in Vienna. Through his efforts a Youth Guidance Centre was established in Vienna whose phenomenal success was such as to lead to the establishment of similar centres in many other Austrian cities.

During the German occupation of Austria Victor Frankl, together with many others of Jewish extraction, became a victim of Nazi racial theory. His entire family--his wife, parents, and brother with the exception of one sister living in Australia--died in these concentration camps. He himself was afforded the opportunity of testing to the limits some of the theoretical propositions of his existential philosophy. In middle life today, he lives quietly in Vienna with his second wife, Ellie, and his young daughter, Gabrielle, in a modest apartment adjoining the Poliklinik Hospital where he lectures and conducts clinical demonstrations. His winsome personal charm, his modesty, and his tremendous capacity for work have won him the renown of his colleagues and students from many parts of the world.

Frankl's Logotherapy

Victor Frankl follows in the tradition of earlier European existentialists. His own version of existential analysis is known by the name of "logotherapy". The Greek term "logos", in this therapeutic approach, has the twofold connotation of "spirit" and "meaning". Logotherapy, hence, focuses on the meaning of human existence as well as on man's search for such meaning. This latter search is made possible because of the spiritual nature of man, a concept which will be explained in a later context. Spiritual concerns, such as man's aspirations for meaning in life as well as the resulting frustrations from such aspirations, are

treated by logotherapy in spiritual terms. They are taken seriously instead of being traced back to instinctual origins. In fact, failing to distinguish between spiritual dimensions and instinctual will lead therapists to confuse healthy and normal symptoms with neurotic symptoms. Not every conflict is necessarily neurotic. Frankl considers the idea that man needs in the first place equilibrium or homeostasis a dangerous misconception of mental hygiene. What man actually needs is not a tension-less state but rather a striving and struggling for some worthy goal, or what Frankl has called "noö-dynamics", i.e. "the spiritual dynamics in a polar field of tension where one pole is represented by meaning to be fulfilled and the other pole by the man who must fulfil it" (Frankl, 1963, p. 107).

According to Frankl, this quest for meaning in life is man's primary motivational force. In contrast to Freudian psychoanalysis which stresses the "will to pleasure" or the Adlerian psychology with its emphasis on the "will to power", logotherapy draws attention to the "will to meaning". Man's search for meaning, says Frankl (1963, p. 99), is a "primary force in his life and not a 'secondary rationalization' of instinctual drives." Meanings and values are not merely defense mechanisms, reaction formations and sublimations, they are genuine expressions of man's true self. In the case where an individual's concern with values and meanings is really a camouflage for psychic conflicts, we are dealing with pseudo-values. Logotherapy as practiced by

Frankl is less retrospective and less introspective than psychoanalysis. It focuses on the present and future rather than on the past. By emphasizing the duties and responsibilities of an individual toward self and society, followers of this school of therapy believe to be able to break the circle formations and feedback mechanisms which play such a forceful role in the development of neuroses. Thus the self-centredness of the neurotic is extinguished rather than reinforced during the psychotherapeutic process. As a result, logotherapy offers promise that the years sometimes demanded by psychoanalysis can be reduced to weeks, if not hours in certain cases.

Logotherapists regard the human "will to meaning" as one of the most valuable assets. It is to this will that they appeal in therapy. Since "existential meaning" is unique and specific in each instance, it must be discovered and fulfilled by each individual alone. In other words, there is no "collective" or "generic" meaning common to all people. If this "will to meaning" is frustrated there results a neurotic condition known among logotherapists as "existential frustration".

According to Frankl, existential therapy was the only successful technique in the abnormal environment of the concentration camp. Stripped to naked existence, with every possession lost, every value destroyed, suffering from starvation, exposure and brutality, hourly expecting extermination, Frankl discovered that life can still be worth preserving. This dis-

covery became the basis of his existential philosophy of logotherapy. "To live is to suffer, to survive is to find meaning in the suffering" (Frankl, 1963, p. xi). Frankl became convinced that if there is a purpose in life at all, there must also be a purpose in suffering and dying. But each individual must discover this purpose for himself and must accept the responsibility for the fulfilment of the same. Frankl is fond of quoting Nietzsche who is to have said: "He who has a why to live can bear with almost any how." In the concentration camp every familiar goal and value is taken away, leaving the prisoner with one last freedom: the freedom to choose his attitude in these circumstances.

Frankl, who himself was a student of Freud, does not think that his theory and his approach in therapy repudiate Freudian analysis. He rather likes to regard them as supplementations and corrections of the former. Nor does Frankl quarrel with other forms of existential therapy, which have made great inroads in Europe after World War Two. Both Freud and Frankl concern themselves primarily with the nature and cure of neuroses. Both believe that these disorders are caused by conflicting and unconscious motives. Frankl, however, distinguishes between several forms of neuroses, some of which (the noögenic neuroses) derive from a sufferer's failure to find meaning and responsibility in his existence. Noögenic neuroses are not caused by conflicts between drives and instincts but rather by conflicts between dif-

ferent values. In other words, they are the result of moral conflicts and spiritual or philosophical problems.

Contrary to Freud, who emphasizes frustration in the patient's sexual expression, Frankl emphasizes frustration in the patient's will to meaning. Unlike many contemporary European existentialists, Frankl is not pessimistic about human destiny. To the contrary, he is quite optimistic about man's capacity to transcend his suffering and find meaning and value in life. Neither is Frankl anti-religious. Medical ministry in Frankl's view should not aspire to be a substitute for the proper cure of souls which is practiced by the clergy. The goal of psychotherapy is to heal the soul, the goal of religion is to save the soul. However there is a definite relationship between psychotherapy and religion. Says Frankl (1963, p. xv):

...the side-effect of religion is an eminently psycho-hygienic one. Religion provides man with a spiritual anchor, with a feeling of security such as he can find nowhere else. But, to our surprise, psychotherapy can produce an analogous, unintended side-effect. For although the psychotherapist is not concerned with helping his patient to achieve a capacity for faith, in certain felicitous cases the patient regains his capacity for faith.

Frankl thus clearly differentiates between the function of psychotherapy and the function of religion. The former has as its end "Seelenheilung", the latter "Seelenheil". Since human nature constitutes a unity, these two functions must of necessity overlap and complement each other. For the same reason, the effects of one function will generalize and achieve similar results in the

other function.

Frankl's View of the Nature of Man

Basic to Frankl's view of the nature of man is his concept of "wholeness". Man lives in three dimensions: the somatic, the mental, and the spiritual. It must be emphasized, however, that they, although having distinctive characteristics, are merely dimensional functions of man. By means of his "dimensional ontology" Frankl hopes to obviate the body-mind problem, yet at the same time do justice to the unity and diversity of the individual.

The body is the material structure of man consisting in an organic union of different systems, such as the nervous, the endocrine, the respiratory, the circulatory, etc.. All of these systems cooperate in the maintenance of the metabolic process through growth and development and subsequent maturity and senescence. The human body is solely the result of genetic and environmental influences.

The mental or psychological dimension is derived from a system of innate drives. Frankl does not develop a theory of the psyche; this, he feels, has been done sufficiently by others. Instead, he sees his task in counterbalancing the one-sidedness which has resulted from an overemphasis of these drives. The observations of Freud, Adler, and Jung have supplied valuable information, but they have omitted the spiritual experiences of

man. Frankl's concept of the psyche approximates Rogers' view of the self: it is constantly changing, so that the decisive activities of the past and present determine the pattern followed in the future. In the words of Frankl (1963, p. 54), "the decisions of today become the drives of tomorrow."

The body and psyche are closely coordinated and comprise the "psychophysicum". Frankl repudiates the behavioristic reduction of the psychophysicum to a materialistic monism. Hunger experienced by a person may well be conditioned by bodily needs, but it is not the bodily need itself.

In logotherapeutic theory man's spiritual nature is of central importance. In fact, it is this spiritual dimension that makes man truly human. While it is proper to speak of man as having a body and having a psyche, it is not proper to speak of him as having a spirit; man does not have a spirit, he is a spirit.

Frankl believes that contemporary psychotherapy frequently suffers from "incompleteness". There is, for example, one view which holds that all psychopathology--or at least its profounder forms--have a constitutional or metabolic basis. Those who advocate this biochemical hypothesis seek objectivity at the expense of truthfulness, or seek to justify the premise that the whole field of mental disorder is the proper and exclusive domain of medical science. Parallel to the peripheral emphasis in psychology is the central emphasis which stresses cognition

or the mental processes of the patient. Logotherapy seeks to complement the peripheral and central interpretation of human nature by adding to the somatic and mental the spiritual dimension. It is the spirit within man that is concerned with meaning and responsibility in life. Questions of meaning and responsibility, however, always embrace the related field of values. Even though psychotherapy belongs to the realm of science, it cannot afford to ignore values. In fact, Frankl contends that there "is no such thing as psychotherapy unconcerned with values, only one that is blind to values" (1962, p. xi). Psychotherapy was born when those in the healing profession first attempted to discover the psychogenesis of physical symptoms. Logotherapy now attempts to go even beyond psychogenesis by seeking to discover and alleviate the "distress of the human spirit". The moment a doctor commits himself to a psychotherapy of the spirit he must take a stand on values. Previously the only obvious philosophical presuppositions that entered into the doctor's work was the tacit affirmation of the value of health. Now he must delve into some of the hidden contributories of mental health, such as meaning, values, and responsibility. "By the use of logotherapy," says Frankl (1962, p. 20), we are equipped to deal with philosophical questions within their own frame of reference, and can embark on objective discussion of the intellectual distress of human beings suffering from psychic disturbances." However, Frankl continues, "while the task of psychotherapy is to

uncover the psychological background of an ideology, the task of logotherapy is to reveal the flaws in improper logical grounds for a world-view and thereby to affect a readjustment of that view." Logotherapy and existential analysis deal with psychic sufferers who are not sick in the clinical sense. Rather, this "psychotherapy in terms of the mind" is specifically designed for those who suffer because of failure to solve some of the philosophical problems which they confront in life. Logotherapy can, however, be very helpful even to patients who suffer from psychopathic symptoms by giving them a sense of security. Thus while therapy should be directed toward that ontological dimension of personality in which the primary causal factor lies, it is also true that the therapist is dealing with a person who constitutes a unit. Perfect health is the result of a harmony between the three dimensions. Not infrequently it happens that when one dimension is brought into balance another recovers spontaneously.

Logotherapy not only recognizes the spiritual dimension in man, it actually begins with man's spirit for, despair over the meaning of life is, according to Frankl, a primary cause of mental disorder or existential neurosis in our day. While the logotherapist seeks to prevent the transference or countertransference of values and responsibility, he does not hesitate to educate the client toward responsibility and help him find his own meaning of existence. Logotherapy uses philosophical ideas as therapeutic tools.

Frankl believes that every psychotherapist owes it to the client to make explicit his implicit concept of the nature of man, for a psychotherapist's concept of man, under certain circumstances, can reinforce a patient's neurosis and be wholly nihilistic. Frankl's own view of the nature of man may be summarized under three concepts: spirituality, freedom, and responsibility.

1. Spirituality. Man's spirituality, according to Frankl, is a "thing-in-itself". It is irreducible and can only be explained by something which is itself spiritual. It may be conditioned by non-spiritual entities or functions, but it cannot be brought into being by these same entities or functions. Thus normal organic processes usually affect the unfolding and subsequent expression of the spiritual life, but they do not cause it or produce it. Since psychotherapy involves the total organism, it must embrace not only the physical and psychic, but also the spiritual. By spirit--"Geist" in German--Frankl means the "core or nucleus" of the human personality. It should be noted that within the framework of logotherapy the word "spiritual" does not have a primarily religious connotation, but refers to the specifically human dimension. Logotherapy is not intended to be a substitute for religion. It has nothing to say and nothing to offer to the religious person who finds meaning and security in his metaphysical beliefs. It can supplement religion however in the case of a non-religious person who is deeply

troubled about philosophical issues. And this supplement is not in the form of giving the client a set of answers to his philosophical questions, but enabling him to see his own freedom and assume responsibility to find such answers. In a sense Frankl's view here resembles Rogers' concept of self-actualization. Logotherapy aims at capacitating individuals to assume responsibility for their own destinies. Thus logotherapy moves along the divide which separates not the psyche from the body, but the psyche from the mind. Frankl himself admits that it is next to impossible to separate psychotherapeutic from logotherapeutic factors. Both have a living connection and are indissolubly joined together in an individual. In other words, Frankl is by no means a trichotomist. Yet, for logical reasons and for reasons of using proper methodology, it is necessary to consider man's psychic aspects apart from his intellectual or spiritual aspects. Both represent realms of human existence which are essentially different from each other.

Man's spiritual nature is derived from what logotherapists call the "spiritual unconscious". This spiritual unconscious is the origin of all consciousness. Thus there are two unconscious areas in man: the instinctive unconscious and the spiritual unconscious. Spirituality, which is the chief attribute of man, cannot be discovered empirically; it can only be discovered phenomenologically. Initially it is revealed in immediate self-consciousness, and then in man's conceptual and

symbolic-linguistic abilities as well as in his reflective self-consciousness. From the spiritual unconscious there emerge, according to Frankl (tweedie, 1961, p. 57), three intuitive moments:

Conscience, by which ethical necessities which pertain to the individual personality and his concrete situation, and thus elude generalization, are conceived; love, by which the unique possibilities of the beloved personality are grasped; and esthetic conscience, by which artistic achievements are guided. These are essentially emotional, and non-rational functions, and can only be rationalized in retrospect. "Unconscious," in reference to the spiritual dimension, always refers to the impossibility of self-reflection. Forced attempts at self-reflection of these intuitive moments thus bring only frustration.

As already stated, man's spirit is essentially unconscious; it cannot be objectified and analyzed. It can only be known "by its fruit". Since it is not a materialistic entity, those reared in the behavioristic tradition find it extremely difficult to distinguish it from the psychophysicum. Spatial characteristics are not applicable here. The spiritual is neither inside nor outside the body, but with (Bei-sein) the psychophysicum. Through the spiritual dimension man can know and in a sense be with other people even though distance or even death separate them. Spirituality helps the individual to transcend space and time.

Spirituality is not always visible in human personality. For example, in mental defects, psychotics, and infants this spirituality may be detected only through careful observation

on the part of "unbiased" observers. Man's spirituality is revealed most fully in his existentiality through his freedom, and in his transcendence through his responsibility.

2. Freedom. Freedom is another characteristic of human nature. This freedom, according to Frankl, is displayed in the face of three things: the instincts, inherited disposition, and the environment.

Logotherapy as practised by Frankl presupposes, first of all, that man is free, either to accept or reject, and to hold in check somatic drives. Frankl is in sharp disagreement with his psychoanalytic predecessors who advocated psychic determinism. Man was seen by them as driven and dominated by instincts. The instinctuality of man was believed to be his decisive characteristic. In Frankl's view instincts merely make proposals which the ego either accepts or rejects. "This ego can decide-- resolve, conclude, freely choose; the ego 'wills'. And it does so independently of where the id 'drives' it" (Frankl, 1962, p. 97). Frankl also exposes Freud's paradoxical notion of ego drives. In Freud's view the ego is essentially opposed to the id or the instincts. Yet the ego is derived from the id. Hence, there is created the strange analogy of a defendant who after his testimony is made the prosecuting attorney and conducts the case against himself.

Frankl illustrates his thinking about the role of instincts by an analogy from boating. "Sailing does not consist

in letting a boat be driven by the wind; rather, the art of the sailor is his ability to use the wind in order to be driven in a given direction so that he is able to sail even against the wind" (1962, p. 97).

Frankl contends that toward the end of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century psychology completely distorted the picture of man by stressing all the biological, psychological, and sociological constraints imposed upon him, in the grip of which he is supposedly helpless. Man's inherent freedom, the freedom of the mind in spite of these constraints, has been overlooked. Yet it is this freedom which is the very core of human personality. Contrary to the animal, man is not determined by his origins. He can transcend the "type". Or, to use another analogy, an individual's destiny belongs to him in much the same way as the ground. Says Frankl(1962, p. 86):

We must accept our destiny as we accept the ground on which we stand--a ground which is the springboard for our freedom. Freedom without destiny is impossible; freedom can only be freedom in the face of a destiny, free conduct toward destiny. Certainly man is free, but he is not floating freely in airless space. He is always surrounded by a host of restrictions. These restrictions, however, are the jumping-off points for his freedom. Freedom presupposes restrictions, is contingent upon restrictions. Mind is contingent upon instincts, existence upon substance. But this contingency does not mean dependency. The ground on which a man walks is always being transcended in the process of walking, and serves as ground only to the extent that it is transcended, that it provides a springboard. If we wanted to define man, we would have to call him that entity which has freed itself from whatever has determined it

(determined it as biological-psychological-sociological type); that entity, in other words, that transcends all these determinants either by conquering them and shaping them, or by deliberately submitting to them.

Man is free, furthermore, in the face of inherited disposition. Frankl relates the story of two cunning identical twins, one of whom became a cunning criminal and the other a cunning criminologist. Both were born with cunning, but the use to which the trait was put depended on "decision". As already intimated, Frankl sees a great danger inherent in the theory of "nothingbutness". Thus many psychologists who cling to "pan-determinism" teach that man is nothing but the result of biological, psychological, and sociological conditioning, in brief, he is the product of heredity and environment. Such a man, according to Frankl, is a robot, not a human being. Human freedom, Frankl concedes, is certainly restricted. Man is finite. Hence, it is not freedom from conditions but freedom to take a stand toward conditions. An individual, for example, cannot prevent the hair from growing, but he can choose to get a hair-cut. Frankl is optimistic that psychiatry is on the verge of taking a new direction in its approach to therapy. He calls the new approach "humanized psychiatry". The mind in this approach is no longer perceived as a mechanism, nor is therapy perceived in terms of a technique. Man's freedom of self-determination is acknowledged and used in the therapeutic process. Even in a neurotic condition, Frankl maintains, there "remains that residue

of freedom toward fate and toward the disease which man always possesses, no matter how ill he may be, in all situations and at every moment of life, to the very last" (1962, p. 257).

Man is also free in the face of environmental conditions.

Frankl (1962, p. xix) cites Freud who once said:

Try and subject a number of very strongly differentiated human beings to the same amount of starvation. With the increase of the imperative need for food, all individual differences will be blotted out, and, in their place, we shall see the uniform expression of the one unsatisfied instinct.

To disprove this Freudian notion, Frankl refers to examples from the concentration camp where it frequently happened that two individuals faced with an identical environment took two altogether different directions. One man degenerated while another attained virtual sainthood. Frankl (1962, p. xix) also calls to mind an article in the American Journal of Psychiatry where J. Lifton describes the responses of American soldiers in North Korean prisoner-of-war camps: "There were examples among them both of altruistic behavior as well as the most primitive forms of struggle for survival." Thus, to the effects of heredity and environment must be added man's choice. "Man ultimately decides for himself! And, in the end, education must be education toward the ability to decide" (Frankl, 1962, p. xix). Even in the physically and socially restricted environment of the concentration camp, man did not lose his ultimate freedom: the freedom to give some shape to his existence. Frankl's observation was that the camp inmates

who succumbed to the forces of psychic deformation were those who had beforehand given up the struggle spiritually. Their freedom to take a certain attitude toward camp life was not taken away from them; they surrendered it voluntarily. Freedom is not something we have and therefore can lose; Freedom, according to Frankl (1962, p. 113), is what we are. In consequence also the symptoms of life in a concentration camp are never merely consequences of somatic and psychic factors, but also modes of existence. Frankl (1962, p. 114) believes that the character changes in the concentration camp inmate are both

the consequences of physiological changes of state (hunger, lack of sleep, etc.) and expression of psychological data (inferiority feelings, etc.). But ultimately and essentially they are an attitude of the mind, a position rationally taken. For in every case man retains the freedom and the possibility of deciding for or against the influence of his surroundings. Although he may seldom exert this freedom or utilize this opportunity to choose--it is open to him to do so. Those upon whom the concentration camp environment had inflicted psychic scars still had it within their power, within reach of their responsibility, to surmount those influences. But what were the reasons that made these people let themselves go spiritually, so that they surrendered without a struggle to the physico-psychic influences of their surroundings? We may put the answer this way: they let themselves go because and only if they had lost their spiritual support.

Frankl does not perceive of man as constantly using his freedom to strive against the conditioning factors of instinctual drives, inheritance, or environment. In many, if not most, of his experiences, his faculty of freedom cooperates with these

forces. Nor does Frankl follow other existentialists, especially Satre, who have overemphasized freedom to the extent of making it the exclusive attribute of man. Man is foremost a spiritual being. The two major characteristics of his spirituality are the ability to choose his own destiny, and the ability to feel and act responsibly.

Human destiny is not so rigid as to preclude all of man's freedom. In fact, man's destiny is the ground of his freedom. The freedom of will or decision is in Frankl's view a matter of course for the unbiased person. "The person who seriously doubts freedom of the will must either be hopelessly prejudiced by a deterministic philosophy or suffering from a paranoid schizophrenia..." (Frankl, 1962, pp. 88-89). Because man is ultimately self-determining, it is impossible to predict his future except within the frame of a statistical survey relating to a large group. The basis of such prediction would have to be biological, psychological, and sociological data. One of the prime features of human existence, however, is man's capacity to transcend such conditions. Frankl cannot conceive of anything that would so condition a man as to rob him of all freedom. Even in neurotic and psychotic cases there is a residue of freedom. "Indeed," says Frankl (1962, p. 135), "the innermost core of the patient's personality is not even touched by a psychosis."

3. Responsibility. Psychoanalysis regards neurosis as a limitation of the ego qua consciousness; individual psycholo-

gy regards neurosis as a limitation of the ego qua a sense of responsibility. In Frankl's opinion both theories are too narrow. A proper view of man must incorporate both: consciousness and responsibility. A basic theorem might be: "Being human means being conscious and being responsible." Thus these two schools are not mutually exclusive but rather complementary to each other.

Human responsibility springs from the singularity and uniqueness of each man's existence. Even in neurotic conditions the individual retains a degree of responsibility because of a certain degree of freedom which he still has. Psychoanalysis with its fixation on man's instinctuality has excluded responsibility, yet in Frankl's opinion a sense of responsibility should be kept in the forefront throughout the therapeutic relationship. However, logotherapy is not primarily concerned with the direction which this responsibility takes. Consciousness of responsibility is ethically neutral. This does not mean, however, that it is passive. The person who feels responsible will at once seek and aspire to a particular goal.

Existential analysis, along with all forms of medical ministry, is content and must be content with leading the patient to an experience in depth of his own responsibility. Continuation of the treatment beyond that point, so that it intrudes into the personal sphere of particular decisions, must be termed impermissible. The physician should never be allowed to take over the patient's responsibility; he must never permit that responsibility to be shifted to himself; he must never anticipate decisions or impose them upon the patient. His

job is to make it possible for the patient to reach decisions; he must endow the patient with the capacity for deciding (Frankl, 1962, p. 270).

Responsibility always implies a sense of obligation.

In the words of Frankl (1962, p. 59), "human freedom is not a freedom from but a freedom to-- a freedom to accept responsibility." It is existential psychology which has restored moral responsibility to psychotherapy. Regarding human life as singular and unique, it summons individuals to actualize in their own lives these unique and singular potentialities. Obligation, however, must be directed toward some object or goal. Frankl suggests three possible goals: First, some individuals will feel responsible to their own conscience. Conscience, like spirituality, is an irreducible thing-in-itself. Frankl concurs with F. A. Weiss whom he quotes as saying: "True morality cannot be based on the concept of the super-ego." Conscience arises when life asks questions of man. In other words, man is being made responsible to life; he experiences himself as the questionee. This same instinct which leads man to fulfil his own life's task also guides him in his responses to questions put to him by life, or in assuming responsibility for his life. It is this "moral instinct" which Frankl terms conscience.

An individual may also direct responsibility toward society. When this is done, however, it remains within the context of individuality and personality. The uniqueness of every individual means that he is different from all other human beings. The mob

has no consciousness and no feeling of responsibility. Therefore it has no existential characteristics. "By escape into the mass, man loses his most intrinsic quality: responsibility. On the other hand, when he shoulders the tasks set him by society, man gains something--in that he adds to his responsibility"(Frankl, 1962, p. 83). Thus a true community consists of individuals each of whom is responsible to the other.

Although Frankl cautions against attempts at spelling out for the individual the object or objects of responsibility, he does suggest that man cannot be responsible to himself alone. Behind man's conscience stands an "extra-human authority". Frankl believes that man in general is much more religious than he suspects. Contrary to Freud who spoke of religion in terms of a projected father image or a general obsessional neurosis of humanity, Frankl is convinced that religion has a factual basis. Responsibility requires the existence of a power or entity higher than man. Psychoanalysts speak of a "confession compulsion" as constituting a neurotic symptom. If the existence of an extra-human realm is postulated then confession may well be a moral achievement. Responsibility implies also the possibility of guilt. Confession or "repentance", although not erasing past behavior, does have the effect of undoing the consequences of the act on the moral and spiritual experience of the individual.

Responsibility in logotherapy is actualized on the ethical and moral plane. Hence, it is the result of a free choice on the

part of the individual. There does not exist in man such a thing as a "moral drive" or a "religious drive". Man is never driven to moral behavior; in each instance he decides to behave morally (Frankl, 1962, p. 101). In the same manner, logotherapy does not resort to moral compulsion. It remains non-committal on the question of "to what" a person should feel responsible--whether to God or conscience or society. To the contrary, says Frankl (1962, p. 269), "the task of existential analysis consists precisely in bringing the individual to the point where he can of his own accord discern his own proper tasks, out of the consciousness of his own responsibility, and can find the clear, no longer indeterminate, unique and singular meaning of his own life." That is why, in Frankl's view, a logotherapist is the least tempted of all psychotherapists to impose value judgments on the patient, for he will never permit the patient to pass to the doctor the responsibility of moral choice. Thus Frankl (1963, p. 112) concludes:

It is, therefore, up to the patient to decide whether he should interpret his life task as being responsible to society or to his own conscience. The majority, however, consider themselves accountable before God; they represent those who do not interpret their own lives merely in terms of a task assigned to them but also in terms of the taskmaster who has assigned it to them.

Frankl's view of the nature of man is best summarized in ten theses which the author develops in his book Logos und Existenz. Central to his theory is his conviction that the human being is a person, rather than a reflex mechanism, or a mere bio-

logical specimen. This conviction is spelled out more fully under the following points:

- (1) The person is an individual, and as such he is an indivisible unity. Even in extreme situations, such as schizophrenia, this fact is not altered.
- (2) Every person is complete in himself. He is not an organic segment of some higher personal unit, such as a race, a social group, or a nation.
- (3) Each person is an absolute novelty: he is a creation of God. "The father is in no way the creator (Zeuger) of his child, but rather a mere witness (Zeuge) of the miracle, that always occurs with the advent of a new human being, a new person" (Frankl, 1951, p. 51).
- (4) The true nature of man is spiritual. The psychophysical organism, though important, is merely the instrument and expression of the real person who is revealed through his spiritual dimension. The organism has "utility", but the person has "worth".
- (5) Man is also existential. He decides, from among the many possibilities presented to him, what he will be, and also assumes the responsibility for his choice.
- (6) A person is an ego and not an id. He is not at the mercy of his instincts, but has the "power" to master his impulses and direct them into channels for his personal good.
- (7) A person is not only a unity and complete in himself, he

- also establishes unity or a sense of balance among his three dimensions which describe the totality of his being.
- (8) A person is dynamic. His personality is not structured and fixed, but rather active and unfolding. He is always in a process of becoming.
- (9) The difference between man and the animal is one of kind rather than degree. Only man can transcend himself and oppose himself in existential decision. Man has a world (Welt), the animal an environment (Umwelt).
- (10) Man can only properly conceive of himself in the light of transcendence, especially through the voice of transcendence in his conscience. Hence to understand man in his true being he must be seen as a creature made in the image of God.

Frankl's View of the Nature of the Good Life

Only man has the spiritual capacity to question the meaning of life. Animals cooperate in symbiotic relationships and carry out intricate instinctive functions, but they never pose questions of a philosophical nature. Even those species who at one point in life commit "suicide" do not do so because of despair concerning the vicissitudes of life. According to Frankl, it is neither abnormal nor morbid to ask questions concerning the meaning of life. In fact, it is a perfectly obvious inquiry, for the good life is that which is meaningful. Spirituality, freedom, and responsibility--the three chief attributes of human nature--

can only be understood in terms of life which has a meaning. Logotherapy attempts to teach patients what Albert Schweitzer has called "reverence for life". This can only be done, however, if the patient finds content or aim or purpose in his existence. "Nothing," says Frankl (1962, p. 62), "is more likely to help a person overcome or endure objective difficulties or subjective troubles than the consciousness of having a task in life." Frankl found that even under conditions of the concentration camp psychotherapy was ineffective unless directed toward the crucial factor of helping the mind find some goal in the future to hold on to. Frankl refers to a poll of public opinion conducted some years ago in France in which eighty-nine per cent of the people polled admitted that man needs "something" for the sake of which to live. Logotherapy seeks to assist the patient to find meaning in his life by making him aware of the "hidden logos" of his existence. This "making aware" resembles very closely the analytical process in psychoanalysis. However, logotherapy does not restrict itself to the sphere of the instincts; it includes also the spiritual dimension, such as the patient's existential meaning to be fulfilled, as well as his will to meaning. Mental health is thus based on a certain amount of tension, the tension between what a person has already achieved and what a person still ought to accomplish.

Logotherapy deviates from psychoanalysis insofar as it considers man as a being whose main concern consists in fulfilling a meaning and in actualizing

values, rather than in the mere gratification and satisfaction of drives and instincts, or in merely reconciling the conflicting claims of id, ego and super-ego, or in the mere adaptation and adjustment to society and environment (Frankl, 1963, p. 105).

The meaning of life, however, has no collective factuality. It differs from person to person, and from hour to hour. Hence, what matters is not the meaning of life in general, but rather the specific meaning of a person's life at each moment. "Everyone has his own specific vocation or mission in life to carry out a concrete assignment which demands fulfilment. Therein he cannot be replaced, nor can his life be repeated. Thus, everyone's task is as unique as is his specific opportunity to implement it" (Frankl, 1963, pp. 110-111).

According to Frankl, the meaning of life is discovered through the actualization of three different kinds of values: creative values, experiential values, and attitudinal values. All of these values have not only a subjective but also an objective reality. The true meaning of life is to be found in the world rather than within the human psyche. By the same token, the real goal of human existence does not consist of self-actualization. In Frankl's (1963, p. 112) own words, "Human existence is essentially self-transcendence rather than self-actualization." The realm of values is thus a "transcendent realm of objective things." Value is necessarily transcendent to the act which expresses it. "As soon as I have comprehended a value, I have com-

prehended implicitly that this value exists in itself, as an absolute value, independently therefore of whether or not I accept it" (Frankl, 1962, p. 46). Unquestionably a certain subjective state of receptivity is the necessary medium for the comprehension of values. But this by no means disproves the objectivity of absolute values; to the contrary, it presupposes them.

Esthetic as well as ethical values are like objects of perception in that they require adequate acts in order to be comprehended; but these acts also, and simultaneously, reveal the transcendence of all these objects as against the acts which bring them to light, hence their absoluteness and objectivity.... Absolute, objective values become concrete duties, are cast in the form of the demands of each day and in personal tasks. The values lying back of these tasks can apparently be reached for only through the tasks. It is quite possible that the whole, of which all concrete obligations are a part, never becomes visible to the individual person, who is limited by the perspective of his day-to-day responsibilities (Frankl, 1962, p. 47).

Human responsibility is always responsibility for the actualization of values. It becomes a concrete demand for every single hour and a personal summons to every single person. The merging of the different values gives them the necessary uniqueness whereby every man feels himself personally addressed and challenged.

In the actualization of these different values the individual is never constrained. Values do not drive or push a man, they pull him. Hence, there always enters in personal freedom: the freedom to either accept or reject values, to either realize the potentiality of meaning or forfeit it.

Frankl strongly objects to any identification of values with pleasure. "Pleasure cannot possibly lend meaning to life" (Frankl, 1962, p. 42). Even in Freud's definition, namely that pleasure is derived from the general tendency of organic life to return to the peace of the inorganic, pleasure remains untenable as a moral maxim. Joy however, may contribute to a person's meaning of life if it itself has meaning. The distinction between pleasure and joy, according to Frankl, lies in that pleasure is non-purposive emotion whereas joy is purposive emotion. Joy always incorporates values.

As already stated, Frankl believes that the good life consists in the actualization of three different kinds of values: creative values, experiential values, and attitudinal values. By creative values Frankl understands the process whereby men give meaning to their lives by the achieving of tasks. There is no possibility of experiencing meaning apart from viewing life as a task. The religious person experiences life even more than a task; he experiences it as a mission! Psychoanalysis, by restricting psychic reality to sexuality, has given a very one-sided and totally inadequate explanation of such creative acts as art, music, religion, etc.. Individual psychology is equally inadequate in its assertion that creativity represents nothing genuine, nothing original, but only a means to an end. Both commit the error of analyzing and judging the validity of every behavioral act on the basis of its psychic origin. Genu-

ine intellectual, artistic, or religious achievement may at times be put to secondary uses, that is, it may serve motives and interests which are essentially alien to it. This does not, however, necessarily account for the origin of these creative acts. Thus the fact that two plus two equals four is an objective truth which has independent validity, even if a psychotic should make such discovery. The actualization of creative values usually coincides with a person's life-work or vocation. Through work an individual's uniqueness stands in relation to society and thus acquires meaning and value. This meaning and value, however, is derived from the person's contribution to society through his work rather than from his particular vocation. It cannot be said, therefore, that one particular vocation affords a person the opportunity to actualize creative values. In Frankl's understanding, a person may more or less actualize creative values in any vocation. For this reason the unemployed many times experience what is known as "unemployment neurosis" because their opportunity to actualize creative values through work is greatly restricted. Such people cannot fully experience the good life through creative values.

By experiential values Frankl means the experiencing of the "Good, the True, and the Beautiful," or, "knowing one single human being in all his uniqueness" (Frankl, 1962, p. xii). Experiential values are realized in human experience, such as when a person is receptive toward natural beauty or is overwhelmed by

an extraordinary event. Such experiences can impart meaning to a person apart from creativity or action. Experiential values are potentially inherent in every situation which the individual confronts; they are in a sense waiting for a person to seize the opportunity and realize them. The highest form which experiential values can achieve is derived from interpersonal relationships. Therefore, values realized in personal relationships take priority over values realized in relationships with inanimate objects. Contrary to individual psychology, which holds that all "worth-while" human behavior is ultimately nothing more than socially acceptable behavior, Frankl believes that there are many values which must and can only be actualized by the individual apart from his relationship to the community.

It can easily be shown that in the realm of values there are whole areas which are the private preserve of the individual. These are values which can or must be actualized aside from and independent of all community. All that we have termed experiential values belong to this category. They lie completely outside the sphere of the community (Frankl, 1962, p. 107).

The actualization of experiential values may at times require emotional involvement. Such outbursts of emotions should be given freedom for expression. "Consistent suppression of intrinsically meaningful emotional impulses because of their possible unpleasurable tone ends in the killing of a person's inner life. A sense of the meaning of emotional experiences is deeply rooted in human beings..." (Frankl, 1962, p. 127).

A third group of values, the actualization of which also constitutes the good life, is called by Frankl "attitudinal values". They are realized through a person's attitude as he faces his destiny, particularly the destiny which calls for suffering. "The right kind of suffering--facing your fate without flinching--is the highest achievement that has been granted to man" (Frankl, 1962, p. xii). The realization of meaning through suffering, however, is only possible when the suffering is unavoidable and inescapable. Even an impoverished existence--one which has restraints imposed upon its potentialities--still offers a last, and according to Frankl the greatest, opportunity for the realization of values.

The opportunity to realize such attitudinal values is therefore always present whenever a person finds himself confronted by a destiny toward which he can act only by acceptance. The way in which he accepts, the way in which he bears his cross, what courage he manifests in suffering, what dignity he displays in doom and disaster, is the measure of his human fulfilment.

As soon as we add attitudinal values to the list of possible categories of values, it is evident that human existence can never be intrinsically meaningless. A man's life retains its meaning up to the last--until he draws his last breath. As long as he remains conscious, he is under obligation to realize values, even if these be only attitudinal values. As long as he has consciousness, he has responsibility. This responsibility remains with him to the last moment of his existence. No matter how sparse the possibilities for realizing values may be--he has always the recourse to attitudinal values. Our startingpoint, the proposition that being human means being conscious and being responsible, is reaffirmed in the moral sphere (Frankl, 1962, pp. 50-51).

In life the opportunities to realize one or another kind

of values vary from day to day and from hour to hour. Sometimes life demands the realization of creative values, at other times experiential values, and at still other times attitudinal values. In other words, at times a person can find meaning in an activity, at other times he finds meaning in an experience. For those who cannot work or surrender to a meaningful experience, there still remains the value of contemplation which can lead to a meaningful existence through a proper attitude toward destiny. What values a person elects at any one moment is not for the therapist to decide. Logotherapy does not rank values, it is content with helping the individual to evaluate.

In the realization of attitudinal values a person frequently meets up with the question why. It is precisely when a person, not knowing the why of suffering, yet finds meaning in it, that he rises to a uniquely human achievement and thus demonstrates his spiritual dimension. The question concerning purpose in human life has led Frankl to adopt the concept of "supra-meaning", which transcends the boundaries of man's existence. Supra-meaning signifies that which cannot be grasped by the human mind. Existence in such instances does not become meaningless, but calls for a response with a person's whole being: emotionally, morally, living to the fullest extent of meaning of which one is capable. Ultimately the question of purpose is one which belongs to the realm of faith. In this context Frankl quotes Einstein who is to have said: "Science cannot provide a man with ultimate

answers to ultimate questions: this is up to man's faith."

Such faith, in Frankl's opinion, is not a kind of thinking; it is this, plus something else: "We think with our brains, but believe with the wholeness of our being" (Ungersma, 1961, p. 129). Ultimate questions are answerable only on an existential basis, in terms of man's total being. Thus Frankl's concept of supra-meaning approximates what theologians have termed "divine providence".

CONCLUSION

The present investigation was concerned with an examination of the moral assumptions underlying the theories and practices of Carl Rogers and Victor Frankl, two existential psychologists representing the American and the European scenes respectively. The two concepts which received particular attention were: the nature of man and the nature of the good life.

The investigation revealed definite likenesses or similarities between Rogers' non-directive client-centred therapy and Frankl's existential analysis known as logotherapy. In the first place, both psychologists are indebted to existential philosophy for providing a vocabulary and a frame of reference for their theories. As may be expected, each existential interpretation reflects the milieu in which it was born. Rogers' concept of self-actualization bears the identification marks of his pre-psychological upbringing and American culture; Frankl's existential analysis reflects his experiences in several concentration camps and European culture. Rogers' psychology lacks that "crisis" note which is so dominant in European psychology, philosophy, and theology.

In the second place, both Rogers and Frankl maintain that there must be no imposition of the personal philosophy of the doctor on the patient. The therapist must guard against assuming responsibility for the patient. However, while Rogers seeks to evade questions which involve value judgments, Frankl feels that the therapist has the right if not obligation to "inform" the

patient of the philosophical and in some instances religious resources available for finding meaning in life.

Thirdly, Rogers as well as Frankl stress the importance of a permissive counseling climate in which understanding and communication between the therapist and patient is maximal. Contrary to Rogers, however, Frankl does not confine himself to one particular method in counseling. Instead, he makes use of a variety of approaches, depending on the nature of the disorder.

Fourthly, Rogers' view of the nature of man approximates that of Frankl, with two exceptions. One is Rogers' paradoxical dualism which explains human behavior in terms of both freedom and determinism; the other is the omission of man's spiritual dimension. Both deviations can be accounted for by the differing intellectual climates of Rogers and Frankl. In America behaviorism, with its stress on "objectivity" and the "scientific method", has gained a strong foothold. Every psychologist who aspires to prominence must pay his dues in homage to them or forfeit his reputation. In Europe, on the other hand, there is a much more cordial relationship between psychology and such related disciplines as philosophy and theology. Consequently there is a free exchange of ideas and a mutual respect for the contributions of each discipline.

Lastly, Rogers' view of the nature of the good life is much narrower in scope than that of Frankl. According to Rogers, the good life consists primarily in the actualization of self;

according to Frankl, the good life consists in the actualization of values which have an objective existence apart from the self which is actualizing them. Hence, Rogers' view of the good life is far more "self-centred" than that of Frankl. In Frankl's view a person finds meaning as he projects himself as it were to something lying outside of him, be it creative works, experiences of beauty, or attitudes toward one's destiny. In Rogers' view a person finds meaning as he discovers himself and his own potentialities for self-actualization. For Frankl the good life is an achievement; for Rogers it is a discovery. The emphasis in Frankl's logotherapy, consequently, is on decision and responsibility, concepts which although mentioned do not play too important a role in Rogers' client-centred therapy.

As already observed, each particular brand of psychology is molded by a number of forces, not the least of which are the moral presuppositions of the psychologist. Comparing Rogers' views with those of Frankl it is possible to observe the effects which the total mentality of a people has on the making of theories. Europeans have suffered much and often through war, famine, and foreign oppression. Hence, one of their major preoccupation has been the quest for meaning and purpose in individual and collective life. When this quest for meaning and purpose remains unrewarded, people either fall prey to a "floating anxiety" or, if their courage sustains them in these crisis experiences, they resign themselves to a kind of stoic skepticism. Existentialism

in Europe is in part an attempt at finding meaning in individual life when history or collective life appears to have lost meaning.

Over against trouble-stricken Europe is America with its unlimited opportunities for material gain and relative security from imminent disaster. The American client also searches for meaning, however, his quest is born not in a crisis experience but in simple boredom. Therefore, the symptoms of this "boredom neurosis" are not so much anxiety and uncertainty of the future, but rather a kind of dissatisfaction and annoyance with the present. America never fought a world war on its own soil, hence, its people have not been conditioned to fear the future.

The existential approach in psychology of Carl Rogers and Victor Frankl may be cited for both its strength and its weakness. Among its positive contributions to psychology are, first, its emphasis on the unity or wholeness of man, without thereby detracting from the richness and breadth of the human personality. Behaviorists also consider man to be a unit, however, their idea of wholeness is derived more from a computer model than from the functions or experiences of the human organism. Another contribution worth noting is Rogers' and Frankl's effort to bridge the existing gulf between psychology and the other social sciences which are concerned with human behavior in both its normal and its abnormal manifestations. Rogers' and Frankl's molar approach to man is, in the opinion of the present investigator, a step in the right direction. Isolating the responses of the human organ-

ism from their corresponding central processes will not yield a comprehensive and realistic view of the human personality. The whole is more than the sum of its parts. Furthermore, Carl Rogers and Victor Frankl are not afraid to state explicitly or implicitly what their philosophical presuppositions are concerning the nature of man and the nature of the good life. Such rare openness and honesty among psychologists is certainly commendable.

The present investigator regards the following as weaknesses in Rogers' and Frankl's approach to human behavior. First, Victor Frankl confines his criticism to psychoanalysis and individual psychology, the two schools that preceded him in Vienna. He seems oblivious to developments in psychology outside of Vienna. Similarly Rogers, although having much in common with his existential colleagues in Europe, pays very little attention to their work. Second, many leading concepts in Rogers' and Frankl's theories have been cast into a philosophical mold, which may be considered a weakness or strength depending on the investigator's own orientation. Both have incorporated into their theories a much broader spectrum of human behavior than is commonly done by psychologists. Due to the infiltration of philosophical concepts into their thinking, Rogers and Frankl find it difficult to define their terms in a manner acceptable to most psychologists. In spite of noble attempts they do not succeed altogether in fitting some of their ideas into a psychological framework. In part this is so because the existing psychological framework has been cre-

ated mainly by theorists who were inclined toward a behavioristic interpretation of human nature.

Research in the area under consideration has been greatly neglected. With the possible exception of the work by Carlton Beck (1963) the present writer is not aware of any similar investigation having been carried out in recent years. The reason for this neglect seems obvious. Psychology in America puts forth great efforts to preserve its newly won status as a science; hence, psychologists avoid investigations which involve philosophical issues. Philosophers, on the other hand, regard such investigations as the proper domain of psychology. By investigating the moral assumptions of two psychologists the present writer has entered a vast "no-man's-land" which is in dire need of being explored. This border area between psychology and philosophy is particularly wide in America where psychology seeks to sever all ties with philosophy and theology and conclude an alliance with the physical sciences. Should psychology in America succeed in this attempt, the need of examining the philosophical foundations of psychology will become even more urgent.

The values which are derived from an investigation of the moral assumptions underlying certain psychological theories are several. In the first place, such an investigation provides a better understanding of the rationale for the different techniques used by psychologists to diagnose and heal mental disorders. It also exposes the basis of the methodology used in studying human

behavior. It furthermore brings into focus the goal which a therapist pursues in therapy. Finally, investigations of this nature can enrich psychology by drawing attention to the breadth of possible approaches to the study of human behavior and the relationship between these different approaches.

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